Every once in a while the ghost of McCoy v. Feinman, 99 N.Y.2d 295, 304 (2002) comes floating into view, (with apology for the mixed metaphor). The importance of this case is as an alternative theory for when the statute of limitations commences to run. Its application is seen in a passing comment in Lambro Indus., Inc. v Gilbert 2024 NY Slip Op 06189 Decided on December 11, 2024 Appellate Division, Second Department. McCoy’s importance is whether there is (ever) a “discovery” onset of the statute of limitations or whether the statute commences (always) when the client “sustained an actionable injury and the cause of action therefore accrued”, or as more neatly put, on the date the attorney made the mistake. McCoy describes a situation where the statute accrues only when the alleged damages are sufficiently calculable to permit them to obtain prompt judicial redress. Obviously, that will be later than the date the attorney made the mistake.
From McCoy: “An action to recover damages arising from an attorney’s malpractice must be commenced within three years from accrual (see CPLR 214 [6]). A legal malpractice claim accrues “when all the facts necessary to the cause of action have occurred and an injured party can obtain relief in court” (Ackerman v Price Waterhouse, 84 N.Y.2d 535, 541, 620 N.Y.S.2d 318, 644 N.E.2d 1009 [1994]). In most cases, this accrual time is measured from the day an actionable injury occurs, “even if the aggrieved party is then ignorant of the wrong or injury” (id.). “What is important is when the malpractice was committed, not when the client discovered it” (Shumsky, 96 N.Y.2d at 166; Glamm v Allen, 57 NY2d 87, 95, 439 N.E.2d 390, 453 N.Y.S.2d 674 [1982]). 2 Though we have recognized tolls on this three-year limitations period under the continuous representation doctrine (see Shumsky at 167-168), we have recognized no exception to measuring the accrual date from the date of injury caused by an attorney’s malpractice. Thus, the key issue on this appeal is when plaintiff’s actionable injury occurred.”
From Lambro: “In March 2019, the plaintiffs, two related corporations, entered into an employment agreement (hereinafter the agreement) with Shivraj Anand, who was then serving as their president and chief executive officer. The agreement contained a provision entitling Anand to certain compensation upon the termination of his employment, which occurred in December 2020. In June 2021, Anand filed a demand for arbitration, alleging that the plaintiffs breached the posttermination compensation provision in the agreement. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs commenced an action in the Supreme Court, inter alia, for a judgment declaring that the agreement is void. In an order dated January 25, 2022, the court, among other things, after concluding that an arbitrator should determine the validity of the agreement, stayed the action and directed the parties to proceed to arbitration.
On January 31, 2023, the plaintiffs commenced this action ostensibly to recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty against the defendants, a law firm and its principal attorney. In the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants drafted the agreement while improperly representing both them and Anand in relation thereto. The defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint. In an order dated December 6, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the motion. The plaintiffs appeal.”
“Here, contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, the Supreme Court properly determined that the sole cause of action—whether viewed as seeking damages for breach of fiduciary duty or legal malpractice—was time-barred (see Oliveto Holdings, Inc. v Denis W. Light, PLLC, 137 AD3d 1095, 1095). The plaintiffs sustained an actionable injury, and the cause of action therefore accrued, when the agreement allegedly drafted by the defendants was executed in March 2019 (see Ackerman v Price Waterhouse, 84 NY2d 535, 541-543; Landow v Snow Becker Krauss, P.C., 111 AD3d 795, 795-797; Iser v Kerrigan, 37 AD3d 662, 663). Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, their alleged damages were “sufficiently calculable” at that time “to permit [them] to obtain prompt judicial redress” (McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d at 305). Under the circumstances presented, the subsequent legal proceedings between the plaintiffs and Anand concerning the validity of the agreement did not affect whether the cause of action accrued at the time the agreement was executed (see DeStaso v Condon Resnick, LLP, 90 AD3d 809, 810-811; McCormick v Favreau, 82 AD3d 1537, 1538-1539; Byron Chem. Co., Inc. v Groman, 61 AD3d 909, 910).
In opposition to the defendants’ prima facie showing that the complaint was time-barred, the plaintiffs failed to raise a question of fact. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ assertion, they did not demonstrate that the continuous representation doctrine tolled the statute of limitations (see McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d at 305-306; Landow v Snow Becker Krauss, P.C., 111 AD3d at 797; cf. DeStaso v Condon Resnick, LLP, 90 AD3d at 812-813). Further, to the extent the plaintiffs [*3]contend, in effect, that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applied because the defendants actively concealed the existence of the agreement, the plaintiffs failed to establish that they commenced the action within a reasonable time after learning of the agreement (see Simcuski v Saeli, 44 NY2d 442, 449-450; Bevinetto v Steven Plotnick, M.D., P.C., 51 AD3d 612, 614; Marincovich v Dunes Hotels & Casinos, Inc., 41 AD3d 1006, 1010).”