The CJEU confirmed this morning in C‑339/22 BSH Hausgeräte GmbH v Electrolux AB (no language versions other than French and Swedish at the time of posting) that in principle Brussels Ia’s exclusive jurisdictional rule for registered intellectual property rights (A24(4) has no reflexive effect. [I suggest below that the reasoning extends to all of A24).
In doing so it did not follow the Opinions of its AG, which I reviewed here for the first one, and here for the second one. (There were two seeing as the case was reassigned to Grand Chamber).
The case in essence concerns two issues: the extent of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Article 24(4) court in infringement claims (as opposed to direct invalidity actions); and the question whether A24 works reflexively: ie whether the surrender of jurisdiction should also be applied in cases where the A24(4) court is not in an EU Member State – previously addressed in IRNova f FLIR. In current case the CJEU frequently cites IRNova, confirming as it were that judgment’s matter of factly rejection of reflexivity.
The Court did, justifiably in my view, follow the AG on the issue of a stay between EU Member States courts, when the claim is one for infringement of an intellectual property right (‘IPR’), and the defendant raises a defence of illegality.
Like the AG the CJEU opts for a “narrow reading” of GAT v LUK: a stay of the infringement proceedings until the A24(4) court holds on validity, and then continued jurisdiction for the ‘infringement’ court. The CJEU
cites [43] the need for a restrictive interpretation of the exceptions to A4’s principled actor sequitur forum rei jurisdiction.
[44] and referring to the AG, a different interpretation would make full jurisdiction for the A24(4) court the rule rather than the exception (seeing as an invalidity defence is run of the mill in IPR infringement cases).
[46] particularly in Member States where civil procedure rules allow for the invalidity defence to be pleaded throughout the proceedings, it would lead to uncertainty of jurisdiction throughout the proceedings.
The question of extra-EU reflexive effect of Article 24(4) then. This is
kicked off [55] by a reference to the core objectives of Brussels Ia: lubrication of the internal market, and (later in the legislative history), part of the creation of a European judicial area. This is an internal EU objective ([55]: [BIa] est un régime de compétence interne à l’Union européenne.
[56] IRNova had already held that A24(4) does not apply where the patent at issue was granted by a third state; [57] A24(4) does not grant any jurisdiction, exclusive or not, to third States;
[59] BIa kicks in the moment there is an ‘international element’, whether the competition between courts is between EU Member States courts or third State courts (reference to IRNova which however at this point had itself referred to Owusu: Owusu rules! ) and [61] in principle a Member State court may well have jurisdiction on the basis of A4 BIa, like precisely in Owusu[ [67] the Court remarks that the 1974 Munich Patent Convention does not dislodge this jurisdictional finding when a third country patent is involved;
[62] ff A73 BIa may lead to alternative fora, either by way of a multilateral agreement such as the Lugano Convention, or through bilateral agreement entered into force before the Regulation; neither applies in the case at issue.
[65] finally A33-34 may lead to a stay issued by the Member State court under the conditions laid down in those Articles: again: these conditions have neither been met nor applied in the case at issue.
[70] now specifically refers to Owusu, to then [71] ponder whether the public international law principle of non-interference in other States’ domestic affairs (one assumes the English translation will use the notion of ‘comity’) alters things. [72] ff while the EU Member State seized of the infringement claim, will also have jurisdiction to hold on the validity of the third country’s patent (and will have to exercise such jurisdiction other than in the bi-or multilateral Convention scenario, or within the confines of A33-34), such finding of (in)validity will only have effect inter partes: an erga omnes (in)validity finding can only be issued by the third State’s courts.
Conclusion [76]:
Il ressort de l’ensemble des considérations qui précèdent qu’il y a lieu de répondre à la troisième question que l’article 24, point 4, du règlement Bruxelles I bis doit être interprété en ce sens qu’il ne s’applique pas à une juridiction d’un État tiers et, par conséquent, ne confère aucune compétence, exclusive ou non, à une telle juridiction en ce qui concerne l’appréciation de la validité d’un brevet délivré ou validé par cet État. Si une juridiction d’un État membre est saisie, sur le fondement de l’article 4, paragraphe 1, de ce règlement, d’une action en contrefaçon d’un brevet délivré ou validé dans un État tiers dans le cadre de laquelle est soulevée, par voie d’exception, la question de la validité de ce brevet, cette juridiction est compétente, en application de cet article 4, paragraphe 1, pour statuer sur cette exception, sa décision à cet égard n’étant pas de nature à affecter l’existence ou le contenu dudit brevet dans cet État tiers ou à entraîner la modification du registre national de celui-ci.
An important de lega lata finding, supported as I had discussed in my earlier posts, by many arguments. Whether the Commission may want to propose de lege ferenda other solutions, is a different call.
The case in principle applies to A24(4) only. Its reasoning however in my view extends across the A24 board.
Geert.
EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2024, 2.217 ff.
https://x.com/GAVClaw/status/1894317278503543192