In July, a bill that would have weakened Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies led to an outbreak of protests. Maryna Rabinovych and Kostiantyn Fedorenko write that while the crisis was swiftly resolved, it highlighted clear lessons for the EU.
For nearly two decades, building effective anti-corruption institutions has been central to EU-Ukraine dialogue and a recurring EU condition, first set out in the 2007 Visa Liberalisation Plan.
Little progress was made until the 2013 Euromaidan Revolution, after which newly elected President Petro Poroshenko had little choice but to establish anti-corruption infrastructure. The National Anti-corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) – the key investigative body – and the Specialized Anti-corruption Prosecutor’s Office, which oversees NABU and prosecutes cases in court, were created in 2015, followed by the High Anti-corruption Court in 2019, completing the system.
However, the operation of this infrastructure often faced political pressure and institutional challenges, with few high-level corruption cases successfully brought to court. In 2020-21, it was nearly inoperable due to political turmoil over the appointment of a new SAP head and NABU director following the expiry of the first incumbents’ terms. The selection was completed in mid-2022 – amid the full-scale invasion and after Ukraine was granted EU candidate status – with the renewal of NABU and SAP operations being one of the seven conditions attached to that status.
Ukraine’s 2025 anti-corruption crisis
Yet after a highly productive first half of 2025 for NABU – with 370 new investigations, 115 suspects (including an acting Deputy Prime Minister and several high-level officials in the defence sector), and 62 convictions – draft law No. 12414, adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on 22 July and signed by the President on the same day, triggered the biggest crisis in NABU and SAP’s history.
This law, which rendered NABU-SAP beholden to decisions by the Prosecutor General, caused a wave of sharp comments from EU officials – like the European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos – and ambassadors from G7 states. Insiders claimed it stalled progress on opening the “Fundamentals” clusters in the EU-Ukraine accession talks, while the OECD warned it could undermine foreign investment in Ukraine, particularly in the defence sector.
Domestically, the law sparked protests in at least 27 locations, lasting a week until the Verkhovna Rada passed a new bill, introduced by President Zelensky, restoring NABU and SAP independence. Though small – often fewer than 100 participants – and largely youth-led, these protests matter: they show the resilience of Ukraine’s civil society even during wartime and confirm that European integration remains high on the public agenda.
The episode also signals that both domestic actors and international partners still influence Ukraine’s politics, making it unlikely the country’s leadership will soon cross “red lines” again. However, there are several interconnected lessons the EU should bear in mind.
The rule of law in Ukraine is still fragile
The dynamics of Ukraine’s anti-corruption crisis illustrate how fragile the rule of law in the country remains. Draft law No. 12414 had originally been a relatively uncontroversial measure regulating pre-court procedures during wartime. The law’s swift adoption reveal an orchestrated process that would be difficult to imagine in a functioning deliberative legislative environment that is grounded in pluralistic debate and checks and balances.
Seen amid the tumultuous history of Ukraine’s anti-corruption infrastructure, the anti-corruption crisis clearly shows the rule of law in Ukraine requires further consolidation. Thus, while tangible progress on Ukraine’s European integration is both needed and desirable, there should be no “lowering of the bar” on fundamental rule of law standards. Rule of law conditionality must remain salient, consequential and safeguarded against ad hoc political compromises.
EU conditionality is only truly effective when supported internally
As the storyline of the anti-corruption crisis shows, both EU pressure and popular protests were crucial in reversing the changes. In the Ukrainian media, the significance of the protests was further underscored by President Zelensky’s efforts to provide students – the core protest group – with benefits afterwards, such as a proposed allowance for male students aged 18 to 22 to travel abroad, an increase in scholarships and a plan to organise two university entry campaigns.
This combination underscores the relevance of an argument previously made by Olga Burlyuk and Natalia Shapovalova, that EU conditionality should be understood not only as an intergovernmental bargaining tool but also as a mechanism of societal mobilisation. It is the interplay of these two dimensions that makes conditionality most effective in tackling backsliding in partner countries. The EU, therefore, needs to invest in a more inclusive process around its conditions, ensuring they are widely known, understood and accepted.
The risk of Euroscepticism in Ukraine needs to be considered
It is well known that Ukrainians overwhelmingly support their country’s accession to the European Union: a recent survey shows 90% support for membership. The idea that Ukraine is currently fighting for its European choice is widely reproduced in the discourse about the ongoing war.
What is less known, however, is that the underlying attitudes towards the EU in Ukraine might be more complicated. The same survey shows that only 46% of the population trusts the EU. The reasons for mistrust are diverse, ranging from unmet expectations regarding European military support for Ukraine, through beliefs that the EU and/or its member states are weak or in decline, to right-wing attitudes towards cultural matters such as migration from the Middle East or gender. In other words, the declared “European choice” of Ukraine might not necessarily mean support for the real-world EU.
The anti-corruption crisis demonstrated how such ambivalence can be exploited by political elites. In a meeting with students clearly aimed at regaining youth support after the protests, President Zelensky’s chief of staff, the powerful Andrii Yermak, dismissed the demonstrators by saying that “not many of the protesters could even tell what NABU was” and that the institution “was created by our partners”.
In doing so, he clearly voiced his (and likely Zelensky’s) attitude towards the organisation: it is viewed as something imposed on Ukraine by the West, rather than something Ukraine itself needs for better governance. This image of the EU forcing change onto the candidate countries is a well-known Eurosceptic trope.
Yuliia Tymoshenko, leader of the Batkivshchyna party that supported the draft law depriving NABU of its independence, was even more blatant, comparing the EU with a dog trainer who punishes misbehaviour using electrical current and saying she “does not want sovereign, independent Ukraine to be treated this way”. To be sure, Tymoshenko is a politician whose time might have passed, yet in essence, her message did not differ all that much from Yermak’s.
The EU needs to understand that Ukraine’s idealised “European” self-perception and readiness to comply with reforms necessary for EU accession do not necessarily go hand in hand. This time, the public did not buy into Eurosceptic arguments as an independent NABU only infringed upon the interests of patronal networks.
However, when another necessary reform concerns interests of a segment of the public (such as farmers or owners of small businesses), the EU should not be surprised when “pro-European” Ukrainians react with a rise in public Euroscepticism. Further, should the war end in a way that Ukrainian society perceives as a relative loss, this risk might be compounded with political accusations against western partners for insufficient assistance.
Perceived integration progress is necessary
To increase public trust towards the EU among Ukrainians, the EU needs to avoid the perception that Ukraine’s accession aspirations are futile. The challenges the EU has experienced with the Western Balkans candidate countries must not be repeated in Ukraine. This means the EU must demonstrate there is a credible accession perspective.
In the case of Ukraine, this is particularly tough given the ongoing war. Being ambitious in terms of opening negotiation chapters, as Ukraine has suggested, would help sustain the momentum. Yet, as the anti-corruption crisis has shown, Ukraine’s rule of law remains fragile.
For this reason, the EU should resist the temptation to abandon objective assessments for the sake of speed. Doing so would risk two consequences, namely rising criticism of Ukraine’s accession among EU domestic electorates, and the possibility of importing unresolved rule of law crises into the EU, as demonstrated by Hungary and Poland.
Finally, the EU should manage healthy expectations among Ukrainians. The idea that Ukraine could soon become an EU member will only lead to disillusionment and provide a future opening for Euroscepticism. The EU should clearly and openly state that valour on the battlefield cannot replace reforms in government.
Note: This article gives the views of the authors, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: photoibo / Shutterstock.com
