New Caledonia, a French overseas territory in the Pacific, might become a state within France. The French government and six delegations representing pro- and anti- independence factions in New Caledonia have signed the Bougival Accord, a draft agreement setting a one-year timeline to reconfigure France’s constitutional system and its relation to its former colony. The accord is unprecedented in France’s legal history, but hardly an oddity in comparative territorial autonomy or post-colonial arrangements. Strategically, it offers France a unique opportunity to consolidate its presence in the Pacific and ensure preferential nickel supply to the European market. All involved parties make concessions in the agreement, yet France seems to come on top, as a weakened pro-independence movement and an understandably exhausted population may favour reconciliation efforts.
This post proceeds in five parts. First, it outlines the legal status of European Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs). Second, it examines the recent background leading up to the Bougival Accord. Third, it analyses the content of the accord. Fourth, it assesses how France has ensured its strategic interests in the accord. Finally, it compares the proposed configuration with other international examples of decentralised territorial governance.
What are the Overseas Countries and Territories?
New Caledonia holds an official status under EU law as an Overseas Country and Territory (OCT), listed in Annex II and article 355 TFEU. OCTs lay outside the internal market, and most treaty provisions do not apply to them ratione loci. However, article 200 TFEU allows OCT imports to enter the EU internal market free of customs duties. New Caledonians are French nationals, and by extension, EU citizens, therefore enjoying all the rights stemming from the EU acquis ratione personae. OCTs are remote, insular territories, vulnerable to climate change and inextricably linked to Europe’s colonial past. Paradoxically, OCT residents possess broader rights in other Member State as EU citizens, than in their own metropoles. Their economies are often undiversified, reliant on a single natural resource (such as fish and nickel) and heavily dependent on financial transfers from the EU or their mainland. Notably, all the Union must financially support OCTs, even Member States with lower GDPs than France. Their cheap natural resources and geopolitical importance are behind the Union’s interest in these territories.
The context of the accord
This reconciliation attempt comes after years of escalating conflict. Tension increased during the December 2021 independence referendum, boycotted by the pro-independence factions citing COVID fears. Civil unrest finally erupted in May 2024, following a botched electoral reform to grant equal voting rights to French nationals residing in New Caledonia for at least 10 years, which was feared it would dilute indigenous Kanaki influence. Civil unrest escalated into riots. The French government responded with military force, resulting in 14 dead and thousands of arrests. Riots severely disrupted the local economy, prompting most companies to halt operations. Economic hardship worsened when the Swiss company Glencore withdrew from the archipelago, citing instability, growing Indonesian competition and insufficient returns. This accelerated the closure of the Kanaki-controlled Koniambo nickel mine. For years, Kanaki leaders had leveraged mineral wealth as a strategic asset to obtain economic and geopolitical mileage towards self-determination. The collapse of the mining sector significantly diminished their bargaining powers.
The Bougival Accord
The Accord signals a return to mutual understanding and hopes for the future. All signatories have pledged to promote the non-legally binding draft agreement within their constituencies, as opposition and contestation are expected across the political spectrum.
The language of the Preamble is quite telling. Terms as ‘independence’ or ‘referendum’ are conspicuously absent, replaced by ‘emancipation’, and ‘progressive decolonisation’. France is portrayed as the sole guarantor of ‘democratic principles and the rule of law’, seeking to legitimise a ‘perennial institutional organisation,’ through the amendment of Title XIII of the French Constitution. France hopes this new configuration will be recognised by the international community, and with it, finally get New Caledonia off the UN list of Non-Self-Governing territories under Chapter XI of the UN Charter and the agenda of the UN Special Committee on decolonisation.
Substantively, the accord proposes the transfer of the following powers to the New Caledonian Assembly: defence, currency, security and public order, justice and legality control. However, there is some fine print here. Under section II.1(c), these transfers are contingent upon a qualified majority vote (36 out of 54 legislators) by the highly fragmented New Caledonian Assembly. For context, currently the anti-independence coalition holds 28 seats, and the pro-independence 26. Should political polarisation emerge, the proposed power transfer might not occur, which might destabilise the very tight timetable the accord sets out. By Autumm 2025 (meaning France’s Autumn), the constitutional reform law must be passed. If successful, New Caledonians will be called to the polls three times in just the first half of 2026.
Pro-independence supporters have already opposed the full omission of any independence aspirations, while anti-independence supporters may oppose granting constitutional recognition to any new territorial configuration. Political parties will have to minimise internal dissent against an accord with no previous consultation, lest this year-long process collapses. It is a considerable gamble for an exhausted population caught between quarrelling political factions.
France keeps the upper hand
Regardless of any potential transfers, France has ensured its hold over the geostrategic pillars defined in its Indo-Pacific Strategy. Paradoxically, the new configuration curtails New Caledonia’s autonomy in international relations. The territory will be constitutionally bound to align with France’s foreign policy goals, a departure from New Caledonia’s traditionally independent agenda in international fora, which sometimes opposed French interests.
France will hold exclusive powers on defence and security, as New Caledonia’s role is limited to consultation without any decision-making power. French armed forces will enforce territorial integrity to prevent any Kanaki provinces pursuing their own independence goals. As regards justice, courts and law enforcement remain under French control. New Caledonia will be permitted to define its own rehabilitation and penitentiary policies, albeit without any jurisdiction on criminal law. New Caledonians may create their own provincial and community policing, which might not suffice to address the systemic shortcomings of a territory in which the indigenous population amounts to 40% of the general population, but 90% of incarcerations. In monetary matters, France is portrayed as the sole guarantor of ‘economic and financial stability’ with the ‘franc Pacifique’ pegged to the Euro. New Caledonians may now choose the symbols on their currency, as little else is provided.
The accord expands the New Caledonian citizenship into a nationality. Nationality will become a prerequisite to participate in upcoming elections, and will be conferred upon any French citizens who have resided in New Caledonia for the last 10 years. The very same provision that ignited the May 2024 riots, and a tough sell for Pro-independence voters who participated in the demonstrations. Another particularity is this nationality’s ancillary nature to the French one. As Kochenov and Geursen argue, only French Nationals can become New Caledonians, thus, renouncing the French nationality results in the automatic loss of the New Caledonian one, but not vice versa.
Nickel supply remains the focal point of the relationship. The accord identifies nickel extraction as essential for French and European industrial sovereignty. With an estimated 20-30% of the world’s nickel reserves in New Caledonia, France secures preferential access to this strategic resource into the European market without custom duties. Under the new framework, China is relegated to second place, despite being its main client. Remarkably, nickel extraction requires vast amounts of energy, beyond the archipelago’s capacity, generating significant social and environmental externalities. Out of all the infrastructure improvements New Caledonia needs, the accord only mentions the transformation of its electrical grid to ensure that nickel production never stops.
A ‘unique’ free-associated state?
None of the proposed transfers are particularly groundbreaking when viewed through a comparative international lens. Local and provincial police forces or foreign affairs competencies are found in federal and autonomous states, such as Germany, Canada or Spain. British Overseas Territories enjoy varying degrees of autonomy, while keeping a constitutional link to the United Kingdom. In the Pacific, the Cook Islands and Niue are self-governing states in free association with New Zealand, which cannot legislate for them. Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia and Palau form the Compact of Free Association, receiving defence, funding and social services from the US, while remaining fully-fledged UN members. Perhaps the closest example to what the accord proposes is the Free-Associated State of Puerto Rico. This unincorporated territory of the US engages in limited international relations in exchange for federal funding, and a US passport for its citizens.
These examples show that more can be done, and negotiated, in territorial distributions of power. Nonetheless, the Bougival Accord cannot be disparaged. It represents an attempt at reconciliation, which should prioritise protecting an exhausted local population over political quarrelling. Strategically, however, the accord reflects a moment of diminished leverage for the pro-independence forces, and a window of opportunity for France to ensure its strategic presence in the Pacific, and a preferential nickel supply for the European market.
Negotiations are far from over. Following the withdrawal of the main pro-independence party (FLNKS) from the agreement, France’s Overseas Minister Manuel Valls is on a countdown to salvage the agreement. FLNKS’s key role legitimising the Bougival Accord has unexpectedly strengthened its bargaining position, and France will now have to recalibrate its strategy to revive dialogue with all stakeholders
