Here, defendants oppose amendment, renew their opposition, and then take an appeal. The appeal fails.
“In May 2016, the plaintiffs commenced this action to recover damages for legal malpractice against the defendant, their former attorneys, who represented the plaintiffs in connection with leasing certain real property located in Manhattan. The plaintiffs amended the complaint in October 2016. In May 2021, the plaintiffs moved pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to serve a second amended complaint. In an order dated March 31, 2022, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion. Thereafter, the defendant moved for leave to renew its opposition to the plaintiffs’ motion. In an order dated January 26, 2023, the court denied the defendant’s motion. The defendant appeals from both orders.
“‘In the absence of prejudice or surprise resulting directly from the delay in seeking leave, applications to amend or supplement a pleading are to be freely granted unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit’” (Toiny, LLC v Rahim, 214 AD3d 1023, 1024 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Myung Hwa Hang v Jang, 164 AD3d 803, 804; see CPLR 3025[b]). “The burden of demonstrating prejudice or surprise, or that a proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit, falls upon the party opposing the motion” (Ditech Fin., LLC v Khan, 189 AD3d 1360, 1362). “‘A determination whether to grant such leave is within the Supreme Court’s broad discretion, and the exercise of that discretion will not be [*2]lightly disturbed’” (1934 Bedford, LLC v Gutman Weiss, P.C., 219 AD3d 1271, 1272, quoting Gitlin v Chirinkin, 60 AD3d 901, 902).
Here, the record reflects that the proposed amendment was neither palpably insufficient nor patently devoid of merit. Moreover, while the plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to serve a second amended complaint was made almost five years after the complaint was first amended, “[m]ere lateness is not a barrier to the amendment. It must be lateness coupled with significant prejudice to the other side, the very elements of the laches doctrine” (Edenwald Contr. Co. v City of New York, 60 NY2d 957, 959 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Toiny, LLC v Rahim, 214 AD3d at 1024). Accordingly, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting the plaintiffs’ motion (see Bisono v Mist Enters., Inc., 231 AD3d 134; Lennon v 56th & Park [NY] Owner, LLC, 199 AD3d 64, 74).”