On 6 December, Romania’s constitutional court annulled the first round of voting in the country’s presidential election. Alexandru Damian writes the decision will have profound consequences for Romanian politics and public trust.
The unprecedented annulment of Romania’s presidential election, decided while the diaspora was voting for the second round and just two days before polling stations were due to open domestically, showcases a critical failure of the national public authorities to ensure electoral safety and integrity. Nearly a week later, no Romanian institution has claimed accountability for this failure.
What happened?
Romania scheduled elections across three consecutive weekends: the first round of the presidential election on 24 November, parliamentary elections on 1 December and the presidential runoff on 8 December. However, the first round of the presidential election upended expectations, with far-right candidate Călin Georgescu winning 22.9%, followed by the pro-EU Save Romania Union (USR) candidate Elena Lasconi (19.18%) and current Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu (19.15%) from the Social Democratic Party (PSD).
Georgescu, a nationalist with far-right and pro-Russian leanings, had polled in the single digits before the election. His rise was driven by an expertly orchestrated social media campaign, particularly on TikTok, but also on Meta and Telegram, where his posts suddenly reached dozens of millions in the final weeks of the campaign. Investigations revealed a network of fake accounts, influencers and algorithm manipulation promoting Georgescu.
Controversy escalated as the public authorities, in a series of inconsistent and poorly justified decisions, approved a recount requested by a fringe candidate, despite the absence of any evidence of fraud. The recount, conducted without independent observers or polling station members, confirmed the initial results, which the constitutional court validated. However, the election’s annulment was triggered days later after a meeting of the Supreme Council of National Defence and a declassification of secret files.
Călin Georgescu
Georgescu’s campaign leveraged far-right rhetoric and disinformation, appealing to disenfranchised voters and the diaspora. His messaging included the promotion of alternative medicine, anti-vaccine sentiments, support for Romania’s exit from the EU, opposition to supporting Ukraine and nationalist propaganda.
These narratives had circulated for years, most likely promoted by the same well-orchestrated online actors, laying the groundwork for his campaign. He capitalised on positions that initially appeared apolitical but were closely tied to his campaign and rhetoric. This occurred despite his reported zero campaign spending, a clear anomaly given Romania’s strict financial regulation.
Despite his outsider image, Georgescu’s career reveals deep connections to Romanian institutions, including the intelligence services. His support base included retired members of security forces and supporters of far-right organisations, including Iron Guard (Romania’s interwar paramilitary fascist movement). A systemic failure to counter disinformation and the normalisation of far-right discourse in the mainstream media, the Romanian Orthodox Church and the Romanian Academy contributed to his success.
Additionally, Romania’s wide socio-economic inequalities and the alienation of its large diaspora created fertile ground for Georgescu’s rise. He capitalised on the anti-system vote, despite his strong ties to the establishment, drawing support from disillusioned Romanians and those feeling neglected by the authorities. He managed to win in the Romanian western diaspora (by a significant margin) and received a substantial share of the vote in small urban and rural areas.
Meanwhile the Social Democrat-Liberal ruling coalition, which has been in power since 2021, suffered a loss in support. The election was the first time since 1989 that neither of the two parties managed to advance a candidate to the second round. They were blamed for halting anti-corruption efforts, presiding over the highest inflation rate in the EU and failing to implement meaningful reforms.
The fallout
The annulment of the presidential election, although justifiable given the available data, raises multiple questions about the timing and the capacity of Romanian public authorities to safeguard the electoral process.
The authorities had access to all the relevant data before the declassification operation, indicating they were fully aware of the campaign supporting Georgescu. This was despite multiple public statements in the weeks leading up to the election claiming there was no foreign interference. The authorities not only proceeded with the election but also decided to recount the votes from the first round, validate the results and open the second round for the diaspora.
The annulment came following a series of other controversial political and judicial actions in 2024. In June, the EU elections were controversially merged with local elections, favouring the ruling coalition. In December, the constitutional court also invalidated the candidacy of pro-Russian SOS Romania leader Diana Șoșoacă, which many viewed as an attempt to ensure a runoff would take place between Ciolacu and populist leader George Simion of the Alliance for the Union of Romania (AUR).
Critics have argued the Social Democrats favoured a runoff between Ciolacu and a far-right candidate to consolidate the anti-extremism vote, suspecting that the real target was Elena Lasconi, a reformist candidate seen as a threat to the ruling coalition. Adding to the controversy, the parliamentary elections, where the far-right Party of Young People gained seats using tactics similar to those used by Georgescu, remain valid, with petitions for their annulment dismissed by the constitutional court.
A loss of trust
The annulment will have profound implications. Trust in democratic institutions might have reached an all-time low and their capacity to safeguard the electoral process is being questioned. The lack of accountability from key institutions, including the Permanent Electoral Authority, the Romanian government and the intelligence services, has fuelled public scepticism.
Although a similar pattern of foreign interference was recently observed in neighbouring Moldova, the Romanian public authorities have entirely failed to prevent such a scenario from unfolding domestically. The situation has been exacerbated by investigative reporting revealing that while the court annulled the elections, the head of Romania’s Foreign Intelligence Service was on a publicly funded trip to a Formula One race.
The far-right movements now have fresh ammunition, framing the annulment as evidence of a “deep state” conspiracy to suppress Georgescu. This narrative is likely to deepen polarisation, boost disinformation and legitimise populist rhetoric in Romania, which is already experiencing a surge in hate speech and extremism. This creates an ideal scenario for Russia to exploit, with its influence campaigns likely to intensify in the coming months.
What’s next?
New presidential elections are anticipated in spring next year, with current President Klaus Iohannis remaining in office until then. The pro-EU parties control 65% of the parliament, with the USR, Social Democrats, Liberals, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania and national minority representatives negotiating a pro-European coalition. However, tensions between the reformist USR and the traditional parties make such a coalition fragile. A debate over a single pro-EU candidate for the future presidential elections is also taking place.
Meanwhile, the opposition is dominated by far-right parties, with AUR, SOS Romania, and the Party of Young People controlling 35% of the parliament. The annulment’s aftermath is poised to reshape Romania’s future political landscape, with far-right populism gaining momentum and public trust in authorities at a breaking point. For the first time, the parliamentary opposition may consist solely of far-right parties.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: LCV / Shutterstock.com
